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California Art Preservation Act: Proving
Actual Damages
by RONALD T. MICHIOKA*
Introduction
Creation of a work of fine art represents much more than the
production of a unique commodity capable of commercial ex-
ploitation. The work should also be recognized as an extension
of the artist's personality which he has injected into the world.'
It is the embodiment of the artist's reputation and honor and is
the ultimate gauge by which his success is measured.2
Notwithstanding the important interests an artist has in his
work, the rights of an artist in his creations are only partially
protected by the legal system of the United States.' His pecuni-
ary rights are protected within the traditional concept of copy-
right.4 The artist's personal or "moral rights,"5 however, have
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1. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
2. Elsen, Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 955 (1976) (quality
of artist's work, not just his best work, establishes his "standing in history"); see also
L. DuBoFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 797 (1977); Karlen, Moral Rights in Califor-
nia, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 683 (1982); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard
Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025, 1027 (1976); Note, Artworks and American Law:
The California Art Preservation Act, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1201, 1215-16 (1981).
3. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. Copyright Revision Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The Copyright Act
reserves for the artist certain rights which enable the artist to put his or her creations
to profitable uses. Section 106 gives the artist the exclusive rights to (1) reproduce the
copyrighted work; (2) prepare derivative works based upon the work; (3) distribute
copies of the work for sale to the public; and (4) to publicly display the work. Id.
§ 106(1)-(4). Any attempt by someone other than the artist to exploit any of these
exclusive rights without the artist's authorization constitutes an infringement of the
artist's copyright. Id. § 501(a). See also Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral
Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244 (1978) (pecuniary
rights include exclusive rights of reproduction, adaption, and performance). A pecu-
niary right is a financial right, one which can be valued in terms of money. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (5th ed. 1979).
5. These personal rights are also referred to as an artist's "moral rights" or
"droit moral." For a comprehensive discussion of the moral rights doctrine, see gen-
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been somewhat neglected by American jurisprudence; they are
neither statutorily protected nor specifically recognized at com-
mon law.6 In contrast, continental jurisprudence has embraced
the "moral rights" doctrine since 1901.' In addition, member
nations of the Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, which is governed by the Berne Convention, have rec-
ognized moral rights since the 1928 Rome Convention.'
American courts, on the other hand, have consistently held
that artists wishing to retain such rights must do so by con-
tract.9 Consequently, efforts to uphold an artist's moral rights
erally Roeder, supra note 1. See also id. at 556 (moral rights consist of right to create
and publish in any form desired, right to claim authorship, right to prevent alteration,
right to withdraw or destroy the work, prohibition against excessive criticism and pro-
hibition against injuries to creator's personality); L. DUBOFF, supra note 2, at 797-855;
Note, The Americanization of Droit Moral in the California Art Preservation Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT. L. & POL. 901, 905-09 (1983).
6. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (moral rights
not recognized by American copyright law which protects economic, rather than per-
sonal, rights of authors); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952); Crimi v.
Rutger Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949); Goetzl & Sutton,
Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 ART &
THE LAW 15, 16 (1984); Merryman, supra note 2, at 1035-40.
7. See Roeder, supra note 1, at 556 ("In 1901 the Cour de Cassation, the highest
French Court, gave official recognition to the [moral rights] doctrine in Cinquin C.
Lecocq."). For a comparative summary of continental treatment of the moral rights
doctrine, see Diamond, supra note 4, at 247-50.
8. The Berne Convention is an international copyright convention and multilat-
eral treaty setting standards of protection for literary and artistic works. Article 6bis
of the Berne Convention, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 27 app.
(1986), provides for the artist's right to claim paternity of the work as well as object to
any alteration of the work which may harm his reputation. Its provisions are en-
forced differently from country to country. Id. § 8.21. The doctrine of moral rights is
recognized in the more than 50 countries that are signatories to the Berne Conven-
tion. See Note, supra note 5, at 903 n.6. The United States is not a signatory nation for
various reasons. A discussion of these reasons and the impact on our copyright laws is
beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, see generally DuBoff, Winter, Flacks &
Keplinger, Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has the United States Participation in
the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential?, 4
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203 (1985). One important impact, however, is that an
artist's moral rights are not recognized in American jurisprudence.
9. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (court protecting artist's personal right to prevent mis-
representation of work under theories of contract and unfair competition); Crimi, 194
Misc. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819. This strict standard ignores the inequitable bar-
gaining position from which the artist must negotiate and the informal nature of busi-
ness transactions by artists. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 261-63; Merryman, supra
note 2, at 1043. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1211 n.55 (artists do not execute formal
agreements because of custom, aversion to business transactions or lack of bargaining
power). A product of this judicial attitude is a reluctance on the part of American
artists to act to protect their interests in their creations. See Merryman, supra note 2,
at 1036. In 1980, the Bank of Tokyo Trust Company in New York removed a seven-
teen-foot rhomboid sculpture which had graced the bank's American headquarters
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have been pursued under the guises of "other conventional and
respectable labels"1 ° such as copyright infringement, breach of
contract, libel, invasion of privacy and unfair competition.
These doctrines, however, are generally too cumbersome to ad-
equately protect the artist's personality. Each in its own way
fails to specifically address the personal interests which moral
rights protect.1'
Moreover, because of their basic inability to compensate or
prevent the mutilation or destruction of valuable works of art,
these doctrines fail to protect society's interest in preserving its
cultural heritage. 2 A work of art is a necessary part of our cul-
ture and heritage, and its integrity should be preserved.13
since 1975. The sculpture's removal required it to be cut into smaller pieces, in effect
destroying the work of art. Isamu Noguchi, internationally renowned artist and crea-
tor of the sculpture, remarked upon hearing of the incident: "It's vandalism, and very
reactionary. I should think they'd ask the artist before they did something like that."
When queried what he intended to do about it, he answered, "As long as they paid for
it, I have no legal right." Glueck, Bank Cuts Up a Noguchi Sculpture and Stores It,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
Another artist took more drastic measures in response to such mutilating acts, but
also doubted the existence of a legal right. In 1960, the influential sculptor, David
Smith, wrote letters to Art News and Arts magazines protesting the removal of the red
paint he put on one of his sculptures:
My sculpture '17 h's,' made in 1950, painted with six coats of cadmium red,
has been partially destroyed by one or more parties involved in its sale and
donation to a collection.... This willful work of vandalism causes me to deny
this work and refuse any future sale to any of those connected with this van-
dalism .... Possibly we should start an action for protective laws.
Kramer, Altering of Smith Work Stirs Dispute, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1974, at 28, col.
1.
10. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21(B) (1986).
11. Professor Roeder asserts that applying such numerous doctrines to an "intrin-
sically homogenous" subject matter produces confusion as to the basic elements of the
cause of action. Roeder, supra note 1, at 575. He goes on to note the problems with
each doctrine: libel's burdens of proof and resistance to injunctive relief; unfair com-
petition's inapplicability "to the protection of personal, nonpecuniary rights;" copy-
right's focus on the exploitative value of creations and protection of the owner of the
copyright rather than the creator; the extreme limitations of invasion of privacy espe-
cially in jurisdictions which niggardly apply their statutes; and contract's denial of the
tort nature of the moral rights doctrine. Id. at 566-68, 575-78. For a comprehensive,
comparative discussion of these functional equivalents, see Diamond, supra note 4, at
261-69. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1203-14.
12. See Merryman, supra note 2, at 1042:
[O]ur law provides no way to protect the public interest in preservation of
our culture against revision of works of art by unilateral unauthorized action.
The underdeveloped state of our law on this topic is not surprising . ..
[W]hat has been rather lyrically called the "triumph of American art" is a
very recent phenomenon. Legal change usually lags behind social and cul-
tural change.
13. Besides protecting the integrity of society's culture, the preservation of art
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California was the first state to statutorily recognize a work
of fine art as an expression of an artist's personality when it
declared that artists have an interest in protecting their works
from alteration or destruction. 14 The California Legislature
also recognized the public's concomitant interest in preserving
its cultural and artistic heritage. 5 These legislative acknowl-
edgements are embodied in the California Art Preservation
Act 6 (Act) which provides that no person may intentionally
deface, mutilate, alter or destroy a work of fine art. 7 Violations
of this statute allow the creator of the altered work to recover,
among other remedies, actual damages."
This Note discusses initially the interests the statute is
designed to protect. It then compares other tort causes of ac-
tion which protect analogous interests, specifically libel, inva-
sion of privacy, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Prima facie causes of action under each of
also stimulates creation by protecting the creator. See Elsen, supra note 2, at 952 (Art
is "a nation's identity card for the present and its passport for the future."); Note,
supra note 5, at 911-12 (protecting an artist's work preserves our cultural heritage and
"promotes the collective interest").
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1986) reads:
[T]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or
destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is
detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest
in protecting their works of fine art against such alteration or destruction;
and that there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural
and artistic creations.
15. Id.
16. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1986).
17. Id. § 987(c)(1).
18. Id. § 987(e)(2). Although the Act provides for injunctive relief (§ 987(e)(1)),
punitive damages (§ 987(e)(3)), attorneys' and expert witness fees (§ 987(e)(4)), and
"any other relief which the court deems proper" (§ 987(e)(5)), this Note will focus
only on the proving of actual damages (§ 987(e)(2)). Actual, or compensatory, dam-
ages are defined as the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for what he
or she suffered as the result of his or her injury. Ward v. DeMartini, 108 Cal. App.
745, 749, 292 P. 192, 193 (1930). This Note postulates that, of all the authorized reme-
dies, actual damages are the most problematic. Section 987(e)(5) seems to provide a
catch-all solution to this problem by allowing for any relief deemed proper by the
court. Since the award for damages is left to the jury's discretion, the question be-
comes whether this section is meant to supersede the jury's discretion. In practice, a
court will rarely impose its judgment over the jury's discretion. See, e.g., Clark Equip-
ment Co. v. Mastelloto, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d 88, 99, 150 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804 (1978) (trial
court not allowed to correct jury verdict by adding to damages; its only recourse is
granting motion for new trial on subject of damages); Bisnett v. Hollis, 207 Cal. App.
2d 142, 150-51, 24 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235-36 (1962) (where jury verdict is insufficient, the
court should require the jury to deliberate further). In addition, the court may only
award the plaintiff relief which is consistent with the allegations in the complaint and
included within the issues. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580 (West 1982).
CALIFORNIA ART PRESERVATION ACT
these torts are discussed from the perspective of an unauthor-
ized alteration of a work of art. This discussion examines the
standards of proof required by each tort and how they may be
applied in a cause of action under the Act. By incorporating the
standards of proof used in these analogous torts, this Note of-
fers an objective approach to the otherwise speculative task of
proving actual damages under the Act. Special emphasis is
placed on the tort of defamation because of its shared interest
in protecting the reputation of the individual.
This Note concludes that the highly speculative nature of
proving actual damages under the Act can pose severe
problems, especially when an "unestablished" artist is in-
volved.19 This Note proposes the allowance of statutory dam-
ages as an alternative remedy to ensure that the artist will be
adequately compensated and that the defendant will be suffi-
ciently deterred from mutilation of artwork.
I
Nature of Interests Protected
The moral rights doctrine protects a "bundle of rights. '20
19. Arguably, the Act's provision for actual damages is no more speculative than
that allowed in other similar torts. However, the value of an unestablished artist's
reputation may often be the source of the problem of speculation under the Act. Rep-
utation is based on an opinion by a member of the artist's community. Tingley v.
Times Mirror, 151 Cal. 1, 27, 89 P. 1097, 1107 (1907). Consequently, an unknown,
unestablished artist will have difficulty in proving his reputation in a community
where he has not had the opportunity to generate community opinion of his profes-
sional abilities. As a result, juries will have greater difficulty valuing harm to his
reputation than they would valuing harm to the reputation of an established artist.
See Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 77, 91, 85 P.2d 949, 964 (1938).
Concededly, courts will presume greater harm to reputation in the case of an unest-
ablished artist than in the case of an established artist. Cf. Behrendt, 30 Cal. App. 2d
at 91, 85 P.2d at 964 (libel case involving a physician). However, even this presump-
tion may yield only a nominal amount in damages where the artist is unable to prove
sufficient reputational harm to warrant a meaningful award of damages. Unless the
artist is convinced that the jury will have grounds to assess damages at a greater-than-
nominal amount, he may be reluctant to assert his or her rights under the Act. The
prospect of recovering only nominal damages in compensation for reputational harm
may deter, rather than encourage, the artist from enforcing his rights under the Act.
20. Varying by jurisdiction, the bundle of rights may include the right to paternity
(to demand that one's name be associated with one's work), divulgation (to determine
when a piece is finished and ready to be exhibited in public), and integrity (to prevent
the alteration or destruction of one's work). Some jurisdictions add the right to create
or not to create, the right of access to one's work, the right to withdraw one's work, or
the right to modify. See generally L. DuBOFF, supra note 2, at 797-867; Lubic, New
York Artists' Authorship Rights Act Incorporates European Moral Right Doctrine, 8
FORDHAM INT. L.J. 362, 362-69 (1985); Merryman, supra note 2; Roeder, supra note 1.
1987]
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The Act adopts two of these rights-paternity and integrity.21
The Act protects the right of paternity by providing that "[tihe
artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or,
for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her
work of fine art. '22 It protects the right of integrity by prohib-
iting any intentional "defacement, mutilation, alteration or de-
struction of a work of fine art. 23
The Act's prohibitions against both the mutilation and the
destruction of works of art 24 protect the public's interest in
"preserving the integrity of [its] cultural and artistic cre-
ations. '25  By providing protection until fifty years after the
death of the artist,26 the Act coextensively protects the individ-
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1986).
22. Id. § 987(d).
23. Id. § 987(c)(1). The Act defines "fine art" as "original painting[s], sculpture[s],
or drawing[s], or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but shall not
include work prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser." Id.
§ 987(b)(2) (emphasis added). "Commercial use" is then defined as work "created
under a work-for-hire arrangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or
other print and electronic media." Id. § 987(b)(7). See also Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v.
Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1984) (architec-
tural plans expressly excluded).
24. Both the alteration and destruction of a work of art harm a society's cultural
heritage. The alteration of a work of art "affect[s] the public enjoyment of art and
affect[s] the national cultural heritage." Note, supra note 5, at 903. Destruction of a
work of art irretrievably "removes something from the cultural heritage of society."
Diamond, supra note 4, at 258. Cf. Roeder, supra note 1, at 570 (destruction of art-
work is of relative importance if the artist is still alive).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1986); see also Roeder, supra note 1, at
577 (public is interested in moral rights doctrine "for it protects the integrity of [the]
culture and, protecting the creator, it stimulates creation"). The California Legisla-
ture reiterates this public interest in section 989: "The Legislature hereby finds and
declares that there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artis-
tic creations." CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a). Professor Merryman notes:
There is also the interest of others in seeing, or preserving the opportunity to
see, the work as the artist intended it, undistorted and unimproved' by the
unilateral actions of others .... We yearn for the authentic, for contact with
the work in its true version, and we resent and distrust anything that misrep-
resents it.... To revise, censor, or improve the work of art is to falsify a piece
of the culture.
Merryman, supra note 2, at 1041.
26. Once an artist dies, the rights under the Act remain with the artist's "heir,
legatee, or personal representative.., until the 50th anniversary of the death of [the]
artist." CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 1986). This duration period for rights
under the Act is equivalent to the duration of rights under the Copyright Act of 1976.
Copyright subsists from the moment of creation and endures for the life of the creator
and fifty years after his or her death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). Further protection of
the artist's name is provided by section 990 of the California Civil Code. Under this
section, a property right in the artist's name is made transferable by contract, trust,
testamentary document or intestate succession. Grantees may exercise this right of
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ual's reputation and the public's interest in its cultural
heritage.
The alteration or destruction of an artist's work also in-
fringes on his statutory rights to reproduce his work and to pre-
pare derivative works.2" The altered work is no longer
reproducible in the form the artist originally intended. In addi-
tion, the devaluation of the work brought about by its unau-
thorized alteration affects the artist's right to resale royalties.29
II
Objectives of Remedies
To effectuate these rights, the Act provides a variety of reme-
dies3° designed to compensate the artist for the violation of his
moral rights and for pecuniary losses sustained. Of these reme-
dies, the Act specifically allows the aggrieved artist to seek re-
covery of actual damages caused by the unauthorized alteration
publicity by disallowing or consenting to the commercial use of the artist's name. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1986).
27. Ostensibly, once an artist passes away, he can no longer be harmed by attacks
on his reputation. His family and heirs, however, can be harmed. It is probably for
this reason that the Act extends the rights beyond the death of the artist. One com-
mentator offers a broader explanation:
The basis of the moral right . . . is not pecuniary but is of a dual nature,
protecting both the creator and the integrity of the culture. During the life-
time of the artist, the first basis is emphasized.... The real reason, however,
for protection of the moral right after the creator's death lies in the need of
society for protection of the integrity of its cultural heritage.
Roeder, supra note 1, at 575.
28. These rights are afforded under the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1),
(2) (1982). The unauthorized alteration of a copyrighted work of fine art would pre-
clude the copyright owner (artist) from reproducing the work since it would no longer
be in its intended form. The right to prepare derivative works may or may not be
infringed since a derivative work is by definition a work of art in and of itself. See
Note, supra note 2, at 1214 n.70 ("the destruction or mutilation of an original work of
art does not result in another artwork."). Cf. Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1504-05 (1979).
29. In California, if a buyer subsequently sells a work of art for an amount ex-
ceeding $1,000, the artist is owed a resale royalty of five percent of the subsequent
selling price. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1986). In other states, the artist must
secure an equivalent right under contract. A model contract, the Projansky-Sieglaub
contract, is available for this purpose. See L. DuBOFF, supra note 2, at 1131-33 (reprint
of contract). A cause of action for resale royalties, however, would logically require
proof that the defendant actually intended to resell the work.
30. The Act allows an artist to seek injunctive relief, punitive damages, and rea-
sonable attorneys' and expert witness fees. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(e)(1), (3), (4) (West
Supp. 1986). The court may also award any other relief it deems proper. Id.
§ 987(e)(5). This Note addresses the Act's provision which allows an artist to seek
recovery of actual damages. Id. § 987(e)(2).
1987]
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of his work.31 Unfortunately, while allowing recovery of actual
damages, the California Legislature has not provided any gui-
dance for calculating actual damages to a sufficient degree of
certainty.2 Actual damages compensate for injuries the artist
has in fact suffered. 3 In the context of the Act, actual damages
would primarily be harm to the artist's reputation. 4
III
Other Torts Protecting Analogous Interests
Since the principal harm caused by the alteration or destruc-
tion of a work of art is to the artist's reputation,35 there exists a
close parallel to the tort of defamation.3 ' By altering a work of
art, the actor, in effect, falsely attributes the creation of the al-
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
32. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
33. Actual damages represent the amount awarded to the artist in compensation
for what he has suffered as the result of an unauthorized alteration of his or her work.
See Ward v. DeMartini, 108 Cal. App. 745, 749, 292 P. 192, 193 (1930).
34. In its opening subsection, the Act declares that the unauthorized alteration of
fine art "is detrimental to the artist's reputation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West
Supp. 1986). See also Elsen, supra note 2, at 955; Merryman, supra note 2, at 1027 (a
work of art is an expression of the artist's personality, therefore distortion of the
work affects the artist's identity, personality, and honor). In the art world, an artist's
success depends on preserving and building his reputation. This reputation is based
on the quality of the artist's work as perceived by others in the art community. Inter-
ference with the integrity of the work by alteration, destruction, or otherwise, be-
comes a personal attack on the artist himself. As one commentator has observed, the
artist must be afforded certain rights to protect the integrity of his works which con-
stitute his reputation. Karlen, supra note 2, at 682. The sponsor of the Act, State
Senator Alan Sieroty, also expressed similar concerns. In a statement to the media,
Senator Sieroty declared that "destruction or alteration of an artwork offends the
artist and harms the artist's reputation." Press release from the office of State Sena-
tor Alan Sieroty (Aug. 1, 1979).
35. See supra note 34.
36. California Civil Code Section 44 states that defamation is affected by either
libel or slander. CAL. CIv. CODE § 44 (West 1982). Section 45 then defines libel as "a
false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to
injure him in his occupation." Id. § 45. This definition of libel has been held to in-
clude almost any communication which has a natural tendency to injure a person's
general or professional reputation. Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal.
App. 2d 486, 493, 284 P.2d 194, 197 (1955). See also Roeder, supra note 1, at 566 (court's
use of libel law to prevent mutilation of artwork denotes recognition of the personal
nature of the interest in reputation and the need to protect such reputation). A cause
of action based on defamation alone, however, is unsatisfactory to vindicate infringe-
ments of an artist's moral rights because of its cumbersome requirements. A plaintiff
artist must set forth the specific words, prove pecuniary damage, and show the im-
probability of injunctive relief. Id. at 575-76.
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tered work to the artist. This directly affects the personality 7
of the artist, as expressed in his creation, and denies the artist
his right to present the work in its desired form. Like a defam-
atory statement, it has the potential to denigrate the artist's
credibility and esteem in the artistic community, and harm the
good will the artist has established throughout his career. The
resultant harm to the artist's reputation may therefore affect
his pecuniary interest in his future marketability. 8
The false attribution of the altered work to the artist also
closely resembles a violation of the artist's right of privacy.39
37. Consistent with the American judicial attitude which denies protection of an
artist's moral rights, courts fail to specifically define the term "personality." Webster
defines personality as "that which constitutes distinction of person; distinctive per-
sonal character; or individuality." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNA-
BRIDGED 1828 (2d ed. 1956). Character, on the other hand, seems to refer more
directly to the person's moral tendencies and values rather than considering the en-
tirety of his being. Webster defines character as "the aggregate of distinctive mental
or moral qualities belonging to an individual." I. at 451. As a legal term in American
jurisprudence, "personality" seems to carry no notable legal consequences. As used in
this Note, "personality" refers to the totality of the artist as expressed in his creations.
It is distinguishable from "reputation" which is an "indication of the opinions of
others." Id. at 2116.
38. Alioto v. Cowles Communications, 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(court considering plaintiff's professional standing and reputation to support recovery
of general damages); Turner v. Hearst,'115 Cal. 394, 399, 47 P. 129, 130 (1896) (allowing
evidence showing extent of plaintiff's law practice because natural and probable con-
sequence of defamatory statement is harm to professional standing and practice). As
in defamatory communications, unauthorized alterations of an artist's work would
tend to expose the artist to ridicule or contempt and disparage his integrity, thereby
adversely affecting his financial standing in the community. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 559 comment b (1977). For discussions of the ramifications of injury to an
artist's reputation, see L. DuBoFF, supra note 2, at 773; Karlen, supra note 2, at 682.
Arguably, a cause of action for interference with prospective commercial or economic
relations may also arise. However, the tenuous nature of the business of fine art may
present insurmountable hurdles when an artist attempts to show that he would have
received the anticipated sales. In addition, the mere alteration of an artist's work,
even if done intentionally so as to interfere with the artist's prospective economic
relations, is insufficient to serve as a basis for recovery unless the act also involves
conduct which is tortious by itself. Ross v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269, 274-75, 190 N.E. 514,
516-17 (1934). See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
§ 130, at 1007-08 (5th ed. 1984). For examples of proofs of reputational harm, see infra
pages 316-19.
39. The right of privacy protects the interest in leading a secluded and private life
without intrusion from others. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603
P.2d 425, 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1979) (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment b
(1977). Unlike defamation, which protects the artist's interest in a good reputation,
the invasion of privacy tort protects the artist's interest in being let alone to create his
work and present it in the manner and form he desires. Fairfield v. American Photo-
copy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86-87, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955).
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The alteration of the work misappropriates the artist's name
for the benefit of the actor and places the artist in a false light
before the public.4"
The alteration may also subject the artist to severe emotional
distress4' brought about by his concern over the threatened or
actual harm to his reputation. Buyers will often rely partially
on the artist's reputation when deciding on their purchases. An
artist with a tainted reputation would be viewed by the buying
public as a poor investment. Understandably, damage to this
valuable reputation could reasonably be expected to cause the
artist severe emotional distress since it would detract from his
livelihood. In addition, the buyer of an artist's work stands in a
relationship with the artist different from the usual buyer-
seller relationship. Because of the intensely personal relation-
ship between the artist and his work, the artist expects the
buyer to protect the integrity of the work, and may be ex-
tremely averse to changes to that work.42 Altering the work of
art without the artist's consent or direction destroys this trust
and infringes on the artist's interest in being free from emo-
tional harm.
By incorporating the proof of damages allowed in the torts of
libel,43 invasion of privacy,44 and infliction of emotional dis-
tress,45 an artist may proceed to objectively prove the compen-
40. Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86-87, 291 P.2d at 197. In addition to the misap-
propriation and false light invasions, the right of privacy may also be infringed by
intrusion on another's seclusion and unreasonable publicity of his private life. See
infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
41. Sections 46 and 312 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts make actionable the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The former section requires "extreme and
outrageous conduct" which intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress. The latter protects against conduct designed to inflict emotional distress. The
latter conduct may be less than extreme and outrageous, but nonetheless must in-
volve an unreasonable risk of foreseeable bodily harm. Section 313 of the Restatement
creates liability for conduct which unintentionally, but negligently subjects another to
emotional distress likely to result in bodily harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 46, 312 & 313 (1977).
42. The defendant's knowledge of this aversion on the part of the artist, and the
concomitant susceptibility to emotional harm, is immaterial with regard to liability. If
the defendant intends to cause injury to the artist, he must take the victim as he finds
him. Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 311, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 588 (1971). If the
act was negligent, there is no cause of action under the Act, which requires an inten-
tional alteration. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1986). See also infra notes
148, 158 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 52-108 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 109-41 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 142-74 and accompanying text.
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sable harms he or she has suffered by the unauthorized
alteration of his or her work.
IV
Proof of Damages
A. Prima Facie Cause of Action Under the Act
A cause of action under the Act is established upon proof of
the intentional act of altering or authorizing the alteration of
the artist's work of art without the artist's consent.46 The Act
requires the artist to further prove that the altered work was
"of recognized quality. '47 The artist must also show that the
work was not created under a contract for commercial use of
the artwork by the purchaser.48 Commercial use is defined in
the Act as the creation of fine art "under a work-for-hire ar-
rangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or
other print and electronic media. '49
B. Proving Actual Damages
Actual damages are those losses or injuries which the artist
has in fact sustained by the unauthorized alteration of his
work.50 Proving actual damages under the Act may be an oner-
ous burden for an injured artist to bear. Pecuniary damages,5'
such as costs to return the artwork to its original condition, or
loss of a promised commission, will usually be relatively as-
sessible. Obstacles arise, however, where the artist seeks com-
pensation for harm in that area which the Act is designed to
protect-his reputation. The artist may place himself at the
discretion of a jury with the hope that jurors will provide ade-
quate compensation for the injury to his valuable reputation. A
wiser course to follow, however, would be to offer affirmative,
46. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
47. Id. § 987(b)(2). A plaintiff artist may rely on the opinions of art experts to
establish the "recognized quality" of the altered work. Id. § 987(f).
48. Id. § 987(b)(2). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. Id. § 987(b)(7). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. Ward v. DeMartini, 108 Cal. App. 745, 749, 292 P. 192, 193 (1930). Black's Law
Dictionary defines actual damages as "real, substantial and just damages, or the
amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or in-
jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979).
51. Pecuniary damages are those injuries which are capable of compensation and
estimation in terms of money. They are not strictly the loss of money, property or
rights, but include any loss, deprivation or injury which can be subjected to calcula-
tion and compensation in money. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1979).
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objective proof of specific reputational harms the artist has suf-
fered upon which the jury may base its assessments. Establish-
ing the artist's reputation in the art community will provide the
foundation from which actual damages will flow. By drawing
from the standards of proof used in the tort causes of action of
libel, invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress, a
system of valuation may be created and applied in causes of ac-
tion under the Act.
1. Applying Standards Used in Actions for Libel
In its initial paragraph, the Act declares that "the physical
alteration or destruction of fine art . . .is detrimental to the
artist's reputation."52 A presumption is raised 3 that the altera-
tion is libelous54 and actionable per se.55 Damage to the artist's
reputation would therefore be conclusively presumed and proof
of special damages, 5 6 such as loss of sales or business opportuni-
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
53. A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. A pre-
sumption is not evidence. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600(a) (West 1982). For hypothetical
purposes, this Note postulates that because the Legislature has declared an unauthor-
ized alteration of artwork to be harmful to an artist's reputation, a court may presume
the fact that an unauthorized alteration of a work of art produces reputational harm.
Damages would therefore be presumed and proof of reputational harm would be un-
necessary. This Note still recommends, however, that the injured artist offer proof of
harm to his reputation in order that the jury may objectively assess damages.
54. By definition, a defamatory "statement" is libelous on its face when it is "de-
famatory [i.e. injurious to the reputation] of the plaintiff without the necessity of ex-
planatory matter." CAL. CIV. CODE § 45(a) (West 1982). Section 45 defines libel as "a
false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to
injure him in his occupation." Id. § 45 (emphasis added).
55. See Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 153 Cal. App. 3d 579, 583, 200
Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (1984) (communication harming plaintiff in his profession and de-
famatory without explanation is actionable even absent a showing of lost employ-
ment); Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 620-21, 86 P.2d 696, 702
(1939) (words with a tendency to injure plaintiff in her trade, even if directed only
towards her goods, may be actionable per se). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 45(a) (West
1982):
A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explana-
tory matter . . .is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not
libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves
that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof.
[emphasis added]. The Restatement additionally defines "actionable per se" as refer-
ring to the fact that the character of the defamatory statement is such that liability
arises despite the absence of special harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569
comment b (1977).
56. Special damages are defined as those which really took place and are not im-
CALIFORNIA ART PRESERVATION ACT
ties, would be unnecessary.57 Furthermore, evidence of a lack
of injury to reputation would be inadmissible. 5
Actual malice on the part of the defendant need not be
shown unless the artist seeks exemplary or punitive damages,5 9
or needs to overcome a qualified privilege held by the defend-
ant.6" Actual, or common law malice is defined as ill-will or
improper purpose or motive.6' It can be shown by proving that
the defendant altered the work of art knowing that the altera-
tion was false.62 Such a showing would not be necessary where
plied by law. They are those damages which do not necessarily arise from the action
complained of and are therefore not implied by law. In such a case, the facts out of
which the damages arise must be asserted in the complaint. See Gomes v. Fried, 136
Cal. App. 3d 924, 939-40, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 (1982); McCready v. Bullis, 59 Cal.
App. 286, 290, 210 P. 638, 640 (1922).
57. See Manguso, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 200 Cal.Rptr. at 540 (even without loss of
employment, statement that is libelous on its face is actionable); Di Giorgio Fruit
Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 569, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1963) (special
damages need not be proven if the article is libelous per se). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 622 (1977). Although courts will presume greater harm to repu-
tation in the case of an unestablished artist, Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal.
App. 2d 77, 91, 85 P.2d 949, 961 (1938), the fledgling artist should nevertheless show
the extent of the harm to his reputation for the purpose of assessing damages beyond
a nominal sum. See infra notes 71-74, 83-106 and accompanying text.
58. Allard v. Church of Scientology, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 450, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797,
803 (1976); Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 64 P. 290 (1901).
59. Exemplary or punitive damages are those damages which may be awarded for
the sake of example or as a means of punishing a defendant who has defamed the
plaintiff with actual malice. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a)(4)(c) (West 1982). Ordinarily,
malice is not an element of a defamation cause of action and need not be pleaded.
Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 156, 116 P. 530, 536 (1911); 5 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, PLEADINGS § 145 (3d ed. 1985). When, however, a plaintiff seeks to re-
cover punitive or exemplary damages, he must plead and prove that the defendant
acted with malice. Hall v. Berkell, 130 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804, 279 P.2d 832, 835 (1955).
60. An artist must show that the defendant acted with actual malice when the
defendant asserts that he had a qualified or conditional privilege to commit the altera-
tion of the work of art. See Mullins v. Brando, 13 Cal. App. 3d 409, 420, 91 Cal. Rptr.
796, 802-03 (1970). The Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that a qualified privi-
lege exists when the defendant acts in order to protect an interest. The interest may
be held by the defendant himself or by a third party, or it may be a public or societal
interest. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 592a Scope Note, at 258 (1977). See, e.g.,
Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (conditional privilege
where employee under a duty to publish defamatory statement in report to defendant
employer regarding plaintiff). Section 47 of the California Civil Code lists situations
where a publication is considered to be privileged. Conditional privileges exist under
the Code when a communication is made to an interested person by one who is (1)
also interested; (2) in a relationship with the recipient which will render the motive
for the communication innocent; or (3) requested by the recipient to give the informa-
tion. CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982).
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a)(4)(d) (West 1982).
62. Hoesl, 451 F. Supp. at 1179 (privilege is lost if abused by acting with malice, i.e.,
knowledge of the falsity of the communication or motivated by ill-will).
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the artist merely seeks actual damages.6" Where, however, the
defendant asserts and proves that he was conditionally privi-
leged in committing the alteration, the artist would then have
the burden of proving actual malice. 64 Such a privilege is usu-
ally only afforded in situations where the act is deemed neces-
sary to further some interest. 5 In the context of alteration of a
work of art, a defendant faces a formidable burden in proving
that the alteration served an interest which outweighs the art-
ist's interest in protecting his reputation.
In actions under the Act, the injured artist would rarely need
to show the stricter constitutional malice66 required by New
York Times v. Sullivan6 7 and its progeny.68 If, however, the
artist holds such an extensive reputation that he would be con-
sidered a public figure69 and if his work is so treasured as to be
considered of public concern,70 then New York Times malice
may have to be shown. However, if an artist in fact achieves
such stature and his work becomes so valuable as to be of public
concern, it seems unlikely that an unauthorized alteration or
mutilation would occur, except in instances of vandalism where
the value of the object of the vandalism is of no consequence to
the actor. Artwork by an artist of such stature will usually
command enough reverence that its mutilation becomes an
improbability.
In spite of these initial burdens of proof, the artist will be
entitled to at least nominal damages.71 This would be appropri-
63. Davis, 160 Cal. at 156 (compensatory damages recoverable without pleading
malice, without proving malice, and in the absence of malice).
64. Mullins v. Brando, 13 Cal. App. 3d 409, 419, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, 803 (1970).
65. See, e.g., Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1983) (no privilege
where no interest of the defendant was protected by the defamatory publication, nor
was there any reason to believe that any interest was endangered so as to make the
defamation necessary).
66. Constitutional malice has been defined by the Supreme Court as acting with
knowledge of the falsity of the act, or with reckless disregard of whether the act was
false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Cases subsequent to New York Times have extended the constitutional malice
requirement to cases in which the plaintiff is a public figure, Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and the subject matter is of public concern, Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); but not where a private plaintiff is involved, Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
69. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 130.
70. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 29.
71. Hearne v. De Young, 132 Cal. 357, 361, 64 P. 576, 578 (1901); Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees and Bartenders Union v. Francesco's B., Inc., 104 Cal. App. 3d 962,
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ate when the jury finds that there has been no substantial harm
to the artist's reputation either because the artist has not
shown that the alteration of his work has caused serious harm,
or because of the insignificance of the alteration.7 2
It is therefore advantageous for the artist to affirmatively
prove his damages. Although he is not required to make such a
showing, he is entitled to do so. 73 By not proving damages, the
artist runs the risk of recovering only nominal damages. In ad-
dition, if he should be awarded a substantial sum, the court may
deem the award excessive and reduce it to what it considers to
be a reasonable amount."
When proving damages, the artist may testify as to his
mental suffering. Mere statements by the artist that he has
suffered mental upset, insomnia, shame, humiliation and loss of
creativity will suffice. 75 He may not, however, introduce evi-
dence of the mental suffering of others, such as members of his
family or friends.76 If he holds a good faith belief that these
others would suffer distress because of the mutilation of his
work, he may testify that his own mental suffering was aug-
mented by such a belief.7 7 If members of his family or friends
in fact suffer mental distress, the artist's mental worry caused
by their suffering will be inadmissible. 7  The artist will be re-
stricted to showing only such mental suffering as was actually
973, 164 Cal. Rptr. 109, 115 (1980). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3360 (West 1982) (al-
lowing recovery of nominal damages where a breach of duty causes no appreciable
detriment).
72. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350,
360 (1963) (court will award at least nominal damages without proof or allegation of
special damages if defendant is guilty of a libel per se); Hearne, 132 Cal. at 361, 64 P. at
578 (nominal damages awarded when a jury finds no substantial harm to reputation).
73. Di Giorgio, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 577, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
74. Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 64, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 529
P.2d 608 (1974); Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 628-29, 86 P.2d 696,
706 (1939).
75. Douglas v. Janis, 43 Cal. App. 3d 931, 940, 118 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 (1974) (plain-
tiff's testimony of his suffering mental upset is admissible); Grimes v. Carter, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 694, 702, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 813 (1966) (plaintiff testifying as to shame, humilia-
tion); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 170, 196 P. 57, 60 (1921) (one element of
damages is injury to feelings of the plaintiff which may be inferred by a direct state-
ment of the plaintiff that his feelings were injured). See also Hall, Proof in Libel
Actions in California, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 365 (1951).
76. Earl, 185 Cal. at 170-72, 196 P. at 60-61; Hall, supra note 75, at 365-66.
77. Waite v. San Fernando Publishing Co., 178 Cal. 303, 306, 173 P. 591, 592 (1918);
see also Earl, 185 Cal. at 170-71, 196 P. at 60; Hall, supra note 75, at 366.
78. Earl, 185 Cal. at 171-72, 196 P. at 60 (plaintiff's mental worry caused by fam-
ily's actual mental suffering is inadmissible).
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caused by the alteration of the work.79
The standard of measuring an artist's mental suffering is
"the susceptibility of the ordinary person occupying the same
position as plaintiff at the time of the [alteration]."' 0 Evidence
of the artist's particular sensitivity to alterations of his work
would therefore be inadmissible,8 1 as would evidence tending to
show an artist's incapacity to suffer mental anguish.8 2
The artist may also show that he has been subjected to ridi-
cule or contempt in the art community because of the distor-
tion of the work. 3 In Meliodon v. Philadelphia School
District,8 4 the plaintiff, a sculptor commissioned by the school
district to produce some models for the Board of Education
Building, sued for damages caused by the district's alteration of
the models after delivery. As part of his claim for relief, the
artist claimed that members of the art world subjected him to
ridicule and contempt since he was attributed with the creation
of the altered models. The sculptor further claimed difficulty
in securing subsequent sculptural contracts. The court found
that his claim stated a cause of action for damages to his reputa-
tion. Unfortunately, the school district was entitled to govern-
mental immunity and therefore could not be held liable in tort
for the acts of its agents.8 5
In an action under the Act, the artist's general good reputa-
79. Id.
80. Tingley v. Times-Mirror Co., 151 Cal. 1, 16-19, 89 P. 1097, 1103-04 (1907); Hall,
supra note 75, at 366-67.
81. Tingley, 151 Cal. at 16-19, 89 P. at 1103-04; Hall, supra note 75, at 367 & n.97.
82. Tingley, 151 Cal. at 16-19, 89 P. at 1103-04; Hall, supra note 75, at 367 & n.97.
83. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1080 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 540
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1982); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky.
424, 430-31, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (1909); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES 429 (1935).
84. 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938).
85. The court found that the school district was a state agency performing govern-
mental functions. The district therefore could not be held liable for the negligence or
malfeasance of its officers or agents. Meliodon, 328 Pa. at 459-60, 195 A. at 906.
In California, the matter of governmental tort liability is entirely controlled by stat-
ute. The court in Datil v. City of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 660, 69 Cal. Rptr.
788, 791 (1968), declared that the Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 (West 1980),
abolished all governmental tort liability except that which is specifically provided for
by statute. Section 815 of the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that, except as
otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury caused by an
act or omission by the public entity, a public employee, or any other person. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 815(a) (West 1980).
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tion will be presumed8 6 and evidence of this general reputation
will be inadmissible.8 7 He may not show, for instance, that he
holds a reputation for honesty and veracity in the community
where he lives. He may, however, prove his social and financial
standing and his reputation as a professional artist since the
mutilation of his work tends to adversely reflect upon that rep-
utation.8 8 Evidence of demands for his work by museums, gal-
leries and collectors would be admissible as would evidence of
invitations to speak at art institutes and universities. The evi-
dence of his professional reputation, however, should be con-
fined to that held in the local art community.8 9
In establishing his professional standing in the local art com-
munity, the artist may rely on opinion evidence. 90 This would
86. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 185-86, 116 P. 530, 548-49 (1911); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 83, at 426; Hall, supra note 75, at 347-48 (it is difficult, however, to deter-
mine when a plaintiff's general reputation has been attacked by the defendant).
87. The artist may offer evidence of his good reputation only upon attack by the
defendant. Davis, 160 Cal. at 186, 116 P. at 548-49; Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 178 Cal.
688, 691, 174 P. 312, 313-14 (1918); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 426.
88. Alioto v. Cowles Communications, 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981) (court considering
plaintiff's prominence in community, and professional reputation and standing); see
also Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 187-90, 196 P. 57, 67-68 (1921) (evidence
detailing plaintiff's social and business history in the local community admissible).
The presumption of a good general reputation is not applicable to an artist's profes-
sional reputation. Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 178 Cal. 688, 691, 174 P. 312, 313-14
(1918). When an artist pleads a good reputation in his professional or business capac-
ity, he has assumed the burden of proving such reputation. The artist cannot wait
until the defendant attacks his professional reputation before offering evidence of a
good professional reputation.
89. Hall, supra note 75, at 348. But cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 426 (proof
of a person's good professional reputation accomplishes the same result as proof of his
good general reputation). Evidence of the artist's professional reputation is admissi-
ble on the question of damages and does not violate the general rule that evidence of
the plaintiff's personal character and reputation is admissible only upon attack by the
defendant. Examiner Printing Co. v. Aston, 238 F. 459, 464-68 (9th Cir. 1916).
90. Hall, supra note 75, at 348-49 (evidence restricted to plaintiff's reputation in
the local community; evidence of specific acts inadmissible). However, courts will al-
low evidence of the artist's reputation where he has done business if the circumstances
so require. People v. Schmidt, 79 Cal. App. 413, 418-19, 249 P. 832, 834 (1926) (allowing
such evidence in large urban setting where it is less likely that neighbors would know
of plaintiff's reputation in his community). The defendant may thereafter attack the
plaintiff's professional reputation, but may not resort to rumors or reports unless
they are so prevalent that they may have affected the plaintiff's reputation. Hall,
supra note 75, at 348-49. In addition, such evidence must be restricted to a period
prior to the mutilation of the artist's work and should address the artist's reputation
for producing works similar to the work as it has been altered. United States v.
Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Witnesses testifying to this effect must be
shown to possess personal knowledge of such reputation. State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637,
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allow testimony of art experts-conceivably the same experts
that were used to establish the "recognized quality" of the
work.91 The applicable sections of the California Evidence
Code 92 would control the admissibility of such expert and other
opinion testimony.
In general, the artist would be required to establish the art
expert's business or professional qualifications.93 The artist
should show that the witness is acknowledged as having a
strong background in the visual arts and a broad knowledge of
aesthetics and art trends. He must also lay a foundation for the
opinion-of-reputation testimony by establishing some associa-
tion between himself and the art expert.94 A showing of the
expert's frequent contact with persons who know of the artist,
such as gallery owners, or persons who have heard of the artist,
such as art critics or collectors, is sufficient to establish this
association.95
When selecting reputation witnesses, the artist should take
care to select persons who are respectable, highly qualified, and
neutral.96 He should consider individuals such as professors
emeritus in contemporary art history, or directors and curators
643-44, 513 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1973) (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948)).
91. Although an expert is not required to offer evidence of the artist's reputation,
in the context of the fine arts business, an art expert would possess the requisite busi-
ness qualifications, frequent contacts with persons knowing the artist and possibly
some association between the artist and the defendant. If such expert witnesses are
unavailable, an artist might attempt an opinion survey within the art community. His
testimony concerning the survey results would be admissible into evidence. People v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank of Franklin Square, 200 Misc. 557, 566, 105 N.Y.S.2d 81, 90-91
(1951).
92. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 800-10 (West 1966 & Supp. 1986).
93. Naples Restaurant, Inc. v. Coberly Ford, 259 Cal. App. 2d 881, 883-85, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 835, 837 (1968); Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal. App.
2d 440, 443-44, 240 P.2d 993, 995 (1952).
94. State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 643-44, 513 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1973) (citing Michel-
son v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1948); State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 104-05,
249 A.2d 232, 235 (1968) (dictum)).
95. Faafiti, 54 Haw. at 643-44, 513 P.2d at 701-02; see also Tingley v. Times-Mirror
Co., 151 Cal. 1, 27, 89 P. 1097, 1107 (1907).
96. ROBERT L. SHAW, CALIFORNIA COURTROOM PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 156 (rev.
ed. 1980); 3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 179 (1959); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 327, 332 (1968).
Preference should be given to highly qualified witnesses, especially those outstanding
in business or professions, or public officials. Testimony from such witnesses tends to
command more respect at trial. As to neutrality of the witness, see People v. Tiner, 11
Cal. App. 3d 428, 434-35, 89 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (1970). In general, the personal interest
of a character witness in the outcome of the case will make his testimony suspect
because the artist himself has selected him.
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of preeminent museums. The leading art critic in the artist's
community should also be considered as a potential reputation
witness. Ideally, these witnesses should be acquainted with the
artist's history and development.
An alternative means of establishing reputation is through
negative evidence. 98 The absence of evidence of a bad reputa-
tion raises the presumption that the artist holds a good reputa-
tion in the art community.99 For example, the lack of
disfavorable reviews of the artist's exhibits or public art com-
missions may sufficiently serve this function.
The testimony regarding his professional standing should
also convey the effect the mutilation of the work has had on the
witnesses' opinions of the artist."°' Testimony to the effect that
conduct towards the artist has changed since the alteration is
particularly persuasive."0 ' If a collector can testify that, after
seeing the altered work, he held doubts as to the artist's future
aesthetic capabilities and would subsequently hesitate to make
purchases of his work, such testimony would lend substantial
support to the claims of the artist.
The artist may also offer evidence of the defendant's wealth,
but only as an indicator of the defendant's social standing and
influence in the art community.0 2 This will allow a jury to in-
fer the probable effect of the defendant's actions. However, the
artist may not show the defendant's wealth to demonstrate the
defendant's ability to compensate the artist.1 0 3
97. Faafiti, 54 Haw. at 643-44. 513 P.2d at 701-02 ("witness must be shown to have
known the [artist] for a sufficient length of time such that it is conceivable that he
would have seen or heard remarks concerning [the artist's work and the quality
thereof]").
98. Negative evidence is defined as "testimony that an alleged fact did not exist."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979).
99. People v. Adams, 137 Cal. 580, 582, 70 P. 662, 663 (1902); People v. Buchanan,
119 Cal. App. 523, 526, 6 P.2d 538, 539 (1932). A witness so testifying must be ac-
quainted with the artist before he can testify that he has never heard anything deni-
grating about the artist's reputation as an artist. See supra notes 94-95, 97 and
accompanying text.
100. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 429 (citing Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News
Co., 195 Mich. 283, 161 N.W. 979 (1917)).
101. Poleski v. Polish American Publishing Co., 254 Mich. 15, 20-21, 235 N.W. 841,
842-43 (1931) (testimony of conversation in which prospective customer rebuffed
plaintiff based on defamatory statement is admissible to establish claim of damage by
showing particular instance).
102. Barkly v. Copeland, 74 Cal. 1, 7, 15 P. 307, 310 (1887); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 83, at 429-30 & nn.48-54.
103. Barkly, 74 Cal. at 7, 15 P. at 310; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 429-30 &
nn.48-54. However, once the evidence of the defendant's wealth has been admitted, it
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Evidence of the defendant's social standing and influence in
the art community may also be probative of the probable effect
of his alteration of the artist's work. °4 In. the incident involv-
ing David Smith's estate,105 the two trustees who altered the
deceased artist's work were a widely-respected art critic and a
well-respected artist.0 6 Due in part to their stature in the art
community, their alteration of Smith's works went unsus-
pected and the artist was unquestioningly attributed with the
creation of the altered works. Arguably, if the actors had been
less respected in the art community, the authorship of the al-
tered works might have been questioned. Damage to David
Smith's reputation might have been avoided and authorship of
the altered works properly disclaimed.
The jury will have broad discretion to decide the amount of
the damages that should be awarded. 07 Its determination will
not be questioned on appeal unless the award is so excessive
that the reviewing court can only conclude that the determina-
tion was based on passion or prejudice. 0 8 Once the affirmative
offers of proof have been made, the jury will have objective
grounds on which to base its assessment of the amount of dam-
ages the artist should recover.
is difficult to imagine it not influencing a jury's calculation of compensatory damages.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 429-30.
104. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 429-30 & nn.48-54 (citing Sclar v. Resnick,
192 Iowa 669, 185 N.W. 273 (1921)) (evidence of defendant's social standing will help
the jury assess the probable weight the community would give to the defendant's al-
teration of the work).
105. The trustees of the estate of the deceased sculptor took it upon themselves to
strip the paint from some of the sculptures to give them the appearance of the earlier,
and more acclaimed, unpainted works by the sculptor. See Kramer, supra note 9, at
28, col. 1; Krauss, Changing the Work of David Smith, ART IN AMERICA, Sept.-Oct.
1974, at 30.
106. One of the trustees was Clement Greenberg, whose critical acclaim of Mr.
Smith's work substantially contributed to the success of the sculptor's career. Mr.
Greenberg personally "favored the unpainted sculptures and depreciated the painted
ones." Merryman, supra note 2, at 1040. The other trustee was Robert Motherwell,
an internationally renowned abstract expressionist and contemporary of David Smith.
See Kramer, supra note 9.
107. Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal. 345, 365-66, 184 P. 672, 681 (1919); Allard v.
Church of Scientology, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 451, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804-05 (1976); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 616 comment a (1977).
108. Ray v. Jackson, 219 Cal. App. 2d 445, 449-51, 33 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341-42 (1963)
(upholding jury award of damages upon review of evidence at trial; award not attribu-
table to passion or prejudice).
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2. Applying Standards Used in Actions
for Invasion of Privacy
The right of privacy has been defined as the right to be let
alone.1°9 There are four ways in which this right may be in-
vaded." ' Because of their applicability to the interests pro-
tected under the Act, this Note will only examine two of the
ways this right may be invaded-the tort of appropriation of a
person's name"' and the tort of publicity which places a person
in a false light before the public." 2
a. Appropriation of a Person's Name
A person who alters an artist's work of art and attributes the
altered work to the artist may be said to have appropriated the
artist's name for his own advantage. Once the work has been
altered, it is no longer the artist's work. If the defendant con-
tinues to hold or display the altered work as a work of the art-
ist, the artist's name has been appropriated for the benefit of
the defendant. 1 3 As a general rule, the appropriation need not
be of the artist's name per se, but may be merely an exploita-
tion of his personality." 4 Altering a work of art so that its style
or form is still attributable to the artist would be an exploita-
tion of the artist's personality rather than a strict appropriation
of the artist's name. Nor does the defendant need to realize a
pecuniary benefit from the appropriation. All that is needed is
109. The idea of a right of privacy may have been first addressed in Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For the origin of the right
of privacy, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 117, at 849-69.
110. Although tied together by the common name of invasion of privacy, each of
the four ways in which one's privacy may be invaded violates separate and distinct
interests. The four torts are: (1) intrusion upon one's seclusion or solitude, or into
one's private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) appropria-
tion of one's name or likeness for the actor's advantage; and (4) publicity which places
one in a false light before the public. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819,
603 P.2d 425, 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 652A(2)(a)-(d) & 652B - 652E (1977).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
112. Id. § 652E.
113. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) (the righ~t to exploit one's name or likeness is personal to the
artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime); Fairfield v. Ameri-
can Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comments b, c (1977).
114. Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 742, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 551 (1969);
Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86, 291 P.2d at 197; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C comment c (1977).
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an unauthorized use of the artist's identity for the defendant's
own purpose and benefit. 115 For example, if the owner of a
sculpture repaints the sculpture so that it matches the uphol-
stery on his newly acquired love seat and continues to present
the sculpture as a creation of the artist, he will have invaded
the artist's privacy. By repainting the sculpture, the owner has
appropriated the artist's name for the owner's prestige and
standing. It is irrelevant that the owner did not realize any
monetary gain.
For the appropriation of his name, the artist may recover
damages for impairment of reputation and standing in the art
community, personal humiliation, and mental suffering.11 6 The
artist's recovery for mental distress is limited to what he actu-
ally suffered and to the kind of distress which normally results
from the mutilation of an artist's work.117 In addition, the art-
ist may recover for the loss of the value of the exclusive use of
his name.""
Unlike libel, where injury to the character or reputation is
the gist of the cause of action, the gravamen of an invasion of
privacy action is a direct wrong of a personal nature which re-
sults in injury to the feelings of the artist. The wrong usually
involves a measure of disregard for the effect the act may have
on the standing of the artist in the art community." 9 This sug-
gests that the primary damage would be mental distress and
hurt feelings.120 The artist should therefore offer evidence of
115. Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86-87, 291 P.2d at 197-98; see, e.g., Hinish v. Meier
& Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (use of name on telegram to Governor
urging veto of a bill).
116. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 137, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 774
(1983).
117. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652H comment b (1974). In one incident of mutilation, a sculpture by
Mary Miss was dismantled by a troop of boy scouts from the sculpture's site at Lake
Placid. The artist expressed feelings of frustration and anger at the loss which also
caused her to miss an opportunity to gain added exposure of her work. Glueck, Sorry
Footnote to Lake Placid, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1980, at C24, col. 4. Other possible scena-
rios may find an artist so distraught that he cancels a planned exhibit thereby losing a
prime business opportunity. Of course, the mental suffering need not entail some
pecuniary loss to the artist, but if such loss can be proved, it would be recoverable as
special damages. Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 88-90.
118. Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 983-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ap-
plying California law) (compensation for use of plaintiff's identity recoverable only in
appropriation cases); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H comment a
(1977).
119. Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86, 291 P.2d at 197.
120. "The right of privacy concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right of
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his hurt feelings, shame, humiliation, and the like. Although
the measure of damages is left to a jury's discretion,121 such af-
firmative evidence of actual harm will provide an objective ba-
sis for an award in the artist's favor.
As in libel, the social status and reputation of the artist
should be averred so that the trier of fact may infer injury to
the artist's feelings. 22 The artist may personally testify as to
his injured feelings in order to establish damages. 123
Proof of actual damages allowed in an action for invasion of
privacy for appropriation of an artist's name is similar, if not
identical, to that used in actions for libel. 24 In an action under
the Act, the artist would not find much to borrow from an ap-
propriation cause of action beyond the proofs of actual damages
he or she may have already borrowed from the tort of libel. In
this sense, the proofs allowed in the appropriation type of inva-
sion of the artist's privacy are redundant within the proposed
scheme for proving actual damages.
b. False Light Publicity
If the alteration of a work of art places the artist in a false
light 25 which would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son, 126 and the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the
falsity of the alteration and the false light in which the artist
would be placed, 27 the artist would have a cause of action for
freedom from defamation concerns primarily one's reputation." Id. at 86. "As in libel,
substantial compensation is allowed for injury to feelings even in the absence of spe-
cial damages." Id. at 88-89 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 109, at 219).
121. Id. at 88 (citing Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 673, 107 P.2d 614, 616 (1940); Diaz
v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 137, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 774 (1983)).
122. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (impairment of reputation
and standing in the community included as compensable actual injuries).
123. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 90, 291 P.2d
194, 199 (1955) (testimony as to social status of plaintiff implies injury to his feelings;
direct statement by plaintiff that his feelings were injured bolsters this implication).
124. See supra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
125. Placing the artist in a false light does not necessarily mean placing him in a
defamatory position. O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal. App.
3d 323, 331, 114 Cal. Rptr. 826, 831 (1974). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 38, § 117, at 864.
126. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 280, 239 P.2d 630, 634-35 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment c (1977). At the very least, a court
will look to see if there is anything uncomplimentary or discrediting in the alteration
which has placed the artist in a false light.
127. This actual malice requirement must be met in order to satisfy the constitu-
tional restrictions placed on actions based on false or defamatory publications. Actual
malice has been defined as acting with knowledge of the falsity of a statement or with
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invasion of privacy. It is not necessary that the artist be de-
famed. The artist need only claim that he has been attributed
with characteristics or beliefs that are false, and has thereby
been placed before the public in a false position.12  The false
position, however, must be of a kind that would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person.129 A good example of an altera-
tion which would have been actionable under the Act is an
incident which involved Alexander Calder, the innovator of the
mobile as an art form. In 1958, Calder's black and white mo-
bile, entitled Pittsburgh, was donated by a private owner for
installation at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.
The municipality unilaterally repainted the mobile in the
county colors of green and gold. For security and liability rea-
sons, the mobile was also immobilized so that its original con-
figuration was altered. Despite the artist's heated protests, the
mobile was not restored until after Calder's death in 1978.130
A cause of action for false light publicity will not lie, how-
ever, unless the alteration has been communicated to the public
in general, or else to a substantial number of people.13' In the
Calder incident, the public display of the mobil satisfied this
limitation. An exception to this limitation exists when a disclo-
sure of the mutilation is made to a limited number of people in
several states who are acquainted with the artist, but not ac-
quainted with each other.132 Thus, if the Calder incident had
reckless disregard for its falsity. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
128. O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal. App. 3d 323, 331, 114
Cal. Rptr. 826, 831 (1974); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 119, 14
Cal. Rptr. 208, 213 (1961); Gill, 38 Cal. 2d at 280, 239 P.2d at 634-35; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment c (1977).
129. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248, 253 (1974); Gill, 38
Cal. 2d at 280, 239 P.2d at 634-35; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment c
(1977).
130. Weil, The Moral Right' Comes to California, 1979 ART NEWS 88.
131. Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 270, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (1980).
Under the Act, an artist may experience great difficulty meeting this requirement
unless the altered work of art is displayed in public museums or galleries. A violation
of the right of privacy must be by printings, pictures or other permanent publications
or reproductions, not by word of mouth. Grimes v. Carter, 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 698,
50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 811 (1966); cf. H & M Associates v. City of El Centro, 109 Cal. App.
3d 399, 412, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 400 (1980) (nature of the privacy invaded should be the
test, rather than the means of communication).
132. Kinsey, 107 Cal. App. 3d at 271-72, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (finding adequate pub-
licity in publication to a small, but widespread group of people with nothing in com-
mon except possible acquaintance with the plaintiff).
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been publicized in a multistate, exclusive art publication, this
exception would probably apply.
If the false publicity is also defamatory,133 the artist may re-
cover for harm to his reputation caused by the false position in
which he has been placed.14  Under Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,'a the artist would be limited to recovering for only actual
injuries. 36 Such actual injuries need not be pecuniary in na-
ture, but may also include any damages he is able to prove. 37
The artist's testimony alone may serve as proof of injury in the
form of emotional distress.3
The artist must therefore show that the alteration attributed
false aesthetic sensibilities to him, thereby causing harm to rep-
utation and subjecting the artist to humiliation, contempt and
mental suffering. 9 As in the misappropriation tort,4 ° the
proof of actual damages allowed in a false light cause of action
mirrors the proof allowed in a libel cause of action.' 4' For this
reason, the false light tort fails to offer additional help in estab-
lishing a scheme for proving actual damages.
3. Applying Standards Used in Actions for Infliction of
Emotional Distress
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
If the defendant's alteration of the work of art is extreme
133. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
134. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 774; Fair-
field, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 90, 291 P.2d at 200.
135. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
136. This requirement imposed by the Gertz court is applied in defamation cases
where presumed or punitive damages are sought and there has not been a showing of
actual malice. Authorities conclude that the Gertz standard would apply to actions for
invasion of privacy based on false light publicity. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 38, at 866; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H comment c (1977). Cf.
Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 275-76, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 617-18 (1980) (proof
of special damages not generally required as an element of invasion of privacy); Fair-
field, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 88-89, 291 P.2d 194 (general damages recoverable without a
showing of a specific loss).
137. The artist may recover for emotional distress or personal humiliation he actu-
ally suffers so long as it is of the type which would normally result from the invasion
by false light publicity and it is reasonable in extent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652H comment b (1977).
138. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 90, 291 P.2d
194, 199 (1955).
139. Id. at 90-91.
140. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 52-108 and accompanying text.
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and outrageous,142 with the intent to cause the artist severe
emotional distress,143 the artist may bring an action for the re-
sulting emotional distress and bodily harm.14 The defendant's
conduct must be shown to have exceeded all bounds of decency
so as to be considered atrocious and intolerable.'45 This can be
evidenced by a showing of any one of the following situations:
(1) repeated and prolonged mutilation of works of art; 46 (2)
abuse of a relationship which gives the defendant authority
over the artist or the power to damage the artist's interests; 47
142. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498-99 & n.5, 468 P.2d 216,
218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments d, i
(1977).
143. Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90
(1970) ("[s]evere means substantial or enduring as distinguished from trivial or
transitory").
144. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946, 603 P.2d 58, 66-67, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,
149-50 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments j, k (1977). Admit-
tedly, such conduct would rarely occur in the context of the fine arts or a cause of
action under the Act.
145. Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 38, § 12, at 59-60. Mere profanity, obscenity, annoyances or abuse
without aggravation are insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Johnson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 228 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir. 1955). See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1058 (1936):
One who, without just cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds of decency,
purposely causes a disturbance of another's mental and emotional tranquility
of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences might be not un-
likely to result, is subject to liability in damages for such mental and emo-
tional disturbance even though no demonstrable physical consequences
actually ensue.
146. Even if the act of mutilating the work of art is, in and of itself, insufficient
grounds to constitute extreme and outrageous behavior, when it is repeated or pro-
longed to the point of hounding, it may then constitute the type of behavior for which
relief may be granted. E.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 12, at 61 (re-
peated invitation to illicit intercourse, accompanied by indecent pictures or exposure,
as grounds for relief). A possible scenario in the fine arts world may involve contin-
ued and consistent alterations of a particular artist's work by a gallery or investment
buyer. Such acts may approach "outrageousness" where gallery catalogues supple-
ment the alteration by visually representing the altered works as those of the artist
without acknowledging the unauthorized alterations by the gallery. In the case of the
investment buyer, he might repeatedly misrepresent the altered works in a series of
sales at auction houses.
147. Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 921, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202 (1980)
(citing Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 296, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547,
552 (1976)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e (1977). The
relationships which have served as grounds for relief have typically involved police,
collecting creditors, employers, and the like. An artist must show that the relation-
ship he shared with the defendant made him sufficiently vulnerable to the defend-
ant's position that emotional distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of the
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or (3) knowledge on the part of the defendant of the artist's
special sensitivity or vulnerability to emotional injury.14
If the artist has established himself to such a degree that he
may be considered a public figure, 149 the artist must then prove
that the defendant's alteration of the artwork was done with
"actual malice" under New York Times v. Sullivan.150 This
standard is met when the jury finds that the emotional distress
has been proximately caused by the defendant's intentional or
reckless mutilation of the artist's work.151
The defendant may also be liable for mutilations intended to
inflict emotional distress although not extreme or outra-
geous. 52 A cause of action lies if the mutilations involve an un-
reasonable risk that bodily harm would result.'53 For example,
in Meliodon v. Philadelphia School District,5 1 the school dis-
trict's unauthorized alteration of the artist's models may not
have reached the level of outrageousness normally required.
The act, however, could have been characterized as carrying an
unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to the artist. The dis-
trict should have realized that its alterations would cause shock
and substantial mental suffering to the artist.
In either case, the artist should offer evidence of the severe
emotional distress he has suffered. 55 The artist may accom-
mutilation of the work. For example, the defendant may be the artist's business man-
ager or agent entrusted with the artist's work and making all promotional arrange-
ments upon which the artist's career depends. But cf. Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App.
3d 295, 303 n.5, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582 n.5 (1971) (dictum) (even where a special rela-
tionship exists, there is no liability if the defendant's acts are merely insults, indigni-
ties or annoyances).
148. Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 162 Cal. Rptr at 202. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment f (1977).
149. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
150. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
151. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 160 (1987).
152. Vargas v. Giacosa, 121 Cal. App. 2d 521, 526, 263 P.2d 840, 844 (1953); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312 comment b (1977). Conduct which is designed to in-
flict emotional distress, is less than extreme and outrageous, but involves an
unreasonable risk that harm will result, is actionable. In such a case, the known risk
makes the act one of extreme outrage.
153. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 794-95, 216 P.2d 571, 572-73 (1950)
(mere words held actionable where collection agency telephoned at 11:00 p.m., threat-
ening plaintiff with regard to overdue bill which she did not in fact owe, resulting in
her illness).
154. 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938). See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
155. In addition to the severe emotional distress, the artist may show bodily harm
which is caused by the emotional distress. Golden, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 308, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 577, 586 (1971).
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plish this by direct testimony of his suffering from anxiety, de-
pression, nervous shock, or any highly unpleasant mental
reaction such as fright, grief, humiliation and the like.156 The
artist must additionally show that the distress is reasonable and
justified under the circumstances,157 unless he is able to prove
the defendant knew of the artist's peculiar susceptibility to dis-
tress. 5 ' Courts will consider the intensity and duration of the
distress in deciding whether it is of the kind that a reasonable
person could not be expected to endure. 59
Attendant bodily harm need not be shown, but in its absence
courts will require more outrage in the defendant's conduct to
ensure the validity of the artist's claim. 6 ' Proof of shock or
other disturbance to the nervous system is sufficient to estab-
lish that the artist has suffered physical injury from the mutila-
tion of his work. 161
Finally, the artist must establish that the mutilation of the
artwork was the proximate cause of his distress.'62 If the de-
fendant intended to cause serious emotional distress, and the
distress which results is shown to be a substantial factor in
causing other injury, the defendant is liable for that other
156. Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 114, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126
(1983).
157. Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for S. California, 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 231, 192
Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 (1983) (courts will take into account the intensity and duration of
the distress). See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 12, at 59. The artist
must show distress beyond mere annoyance or affront to dignity. Otherwise, "the
distress must be such as a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would undergo
under the circumstances." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 12, at 63 (citing
March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. App. 2d 235, 242-43, 185 N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (1962)).
158. See supra note 148.
159. Kiseskey, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 231, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 497; Fletcher v. W. Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90-91 (1970).
160. Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 970, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980); Fuentes v.
Perez, 66 Cal. App. 3d 163, 169-71, 136 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1977); Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal.
App.3d 295, 308, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 586 (1971).
161. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 218 (1970) (psy-
chopathological states considered "physical" and include nervous disorders, depres-
sion and nervous shock); Leasman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 48 Cal. App. 3d 376, 382,
121 Cal. Rptr. 768, 771 (1975); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 797, 56
Cal. Rptr. 115, 117 (1967). See also BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI)
§ 12.71 (1986). The term "physical harm," as used in these instructions, includes not
only physical injury and bodily illness, but also the physical consequences of shock to
the nervous system. Id.
162. Causation is initially decided as a question of law by the court. If the evidence
offered is such that conflicting conclusions can be drawn, the decision becomes a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. See Golden, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The defendant may negligently cause emotional harm to the
artist and may be liable for the bodily harm the artist suffers as
a result of the negligent act.1 64 If the defendant should have
known that his mutilation of the artwork carried with it an un-
reasonable risk of causing the distress, he will be liable.165 A
resulting physical injury is no longer required so long as a
proper showing is made that the defendant should have fore-
seen shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in an ordi-
nary person.
166
c. Damages for Emotional Distress
The measure of damages for emotional distress is the amount
which will adequately compensate the artist for the harm he
has suffered.167 In contrast to libel and invasion of privacy, the
reputation of the artist is immaterial in an action for infliction
of emotional distress. 68
163. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 909, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 36 (1960).
164. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968);
Ramos v. Valley Vista Hosp., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1244, 1248-49, 234 Cal. Rptr. 608, 610-11
(1987); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727
(1976); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 724 (1969);
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 794-95, 216 P.2d 571, 572-73 (1950); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1977).
165. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress rests on grounds of fore-
seeability. If the defendant should have known that his conduct carried with it an
unreasonable risk of causing harm to the artist, then the law will hold him liable.
Ochoa v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 159, 166, 703 P.2d 1, 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (1985);
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 921-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82; Kossel v. Superior
Ct., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1067, 231 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (1986); Bowden, 96 Cal. App. 2d
at 795, 216 P.2d at 573. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 comment b
(1977).
166. This is the California rule; other jurisdictions vary. See Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930-31, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980)
(damages awarded without physical injury; validity of claims ensured by standards of
proof). Cf., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment a (1977); Linker v.
Custom-Bilt Machinery, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 894, 901 (E.D. Penn. 1984).
167. The measure of damages is the same as in other tort actions, and is equal to
the amount "which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1982).
168. The tort is designed to compensate for hurt feelings, pain, and suffering re-
gardless of the status of the plaintiff. If the defendant's act defames the artist, a cause
of action is stated for defamation. Emotional distress then becomes a factor in deter-
mining damages. It does not create a second independent cause of action. Grimes v.
Carter, 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 702, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 813 (1966).
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Elements of damages which may be elicited from the artist or
other witnesses include any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, an-
ger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.169 Compensa-
ble physical consequences of emotional distress include directly
or indirectly resulting illness or bodily injury such as shock,
nausea, and insomnia.1Y0 Other physical consequences include
excitement,' 71 miscarriage,"' aggravation of pre-existing condi-
tions, 73 and personality disorders. 174 The artist should offer ev-
idence of any or all of these injuries caused by the defendant's
alteration of the artist's work.
4. Value of Lost Resale Royalties
A separate and distinct damage the artist may suffer is loss of
his statutory right to a resale royalty.' Section 986 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code entitles an artist to a five percent resale roy-
alty for any resales of his or her artwork in California for any
price exceeding one thousand dollars. 7 6 Mutilation or destruc-
tion of an artist's work would operate to deny the artist this
potential royalty. 7 7 The defendant's act could devalue the
work so that it could no longer command the requisite one
thousand dollar resale price.7 8 Also, the artist may exercise
his right to disclaim authorship of the work, 79 in which case he
would no longer be eligible for the resale royalty since he
169. Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 114, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126
(1983) (citing Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 311, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 588 (1971));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1977).
170. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P. 2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1970).
171. Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249 P.2d 843, 844 (1952).
172. Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 17 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1961); Richardson
v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950).
173. Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P.2d 696 (1948).
174. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
175. When the original purchaser of a work of art resells the work at an appreci-
ated price, California law requires the seller to remit a resale royalty to the creator of
the work of art. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
176. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). The right to the royalty may
not be waived unless by contract providing a higher rate of payment than that pro-
vided by this section. Id. § 986(a).
177. See Karlen, supra note 2, at 712.
178. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). The section does not apply to
any resale for a gross price of less than one thousand dollars.
179. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d) (West Supp. 1986). If there exists a "just and valid
reason," the artist may disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art. Id.
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would no longer be "the artist of such work of fine art. '180
The "potential" status of the resale royalty suggests that the
artist must show the probability of a resale of the artwork.
Since no resale royalty is generated until the artwork is actu-
ally sold,. the artist would undoubtedly have to show that the
work was intended for, or scheduled for resale. Existence of a
contract between the defendant and a third party for such a
resale would be conclusive, 81 while showing that the defendant
is a speculator or investment buyer in art would be per-
suasive.182
If this burden of proof is met, the artist would then have to
establish the value of the lost work.183 In attempting to value a
work of art at the time it sustained damage, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Merchants Fire As-
surance Corp. v. Lattimore,14 held that original or unique
works of art do not necessarily lose their entire value when
damaged. According to expert testimony at trial, properly re-
stored works of art may regain their original value and con-
tinue to appreciate with the passage of time.8 5 An artist who is
bringing an action under the Act would have to rebut this find-
ing by showing that the altered work is either unsuitable for
restoration or could no longer be resold for more than one
thousand dollars.
If this rebuttal is successful, the artist must then prove the
resale value of the altered work. This may be based on the
original selling price of the work with a reasonable increase
brought about by appreciation.8 6 The artist himself may con-
tribute other factors such as the worth of the lost piece in com-
parison to other works in his oeuvre 18 or the existence, or
180. A seller is required to pay the royalty to "the artist of such work of fine art."
CAL. CiV. CODE § 986(a) (West Supp. 1986).
181. See Karlen, supra note 2, at 712 n.231.
182. Showing that the defendant regularly engages in speculative investment in
fine art would imply that he always intended to resell the altered work as is his
custom.
183. This would presume, of course, that the artist has kept accurate records of
past sales or exhibitions which would be necessary to substantiate his estimates of the
value of the altered work. However, artists in general tend to avoid formal business
transactions. See sources cited supra note 9.
184. 263 F.2d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1959).
185. Id. (citing testimony of Benjamin W. Langman).
186. In order to establish a reasonable rate of appreciation, the artist would have to
depend on the testimony of experts experienced in the sale of fine art such as apprais-
ers, auctioneers, or gallery owners.
187. An artist's oeuvre is the entire body of work he has created during his career.
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nonexistence, of duplicates of the altered work. 18  An expert
appraisal, however, would have the most evidentiary value be-
cause of its greater objectivity and neutrality. 89
The resultant resale value may then be used as the basis for
assessing the loss of resale royalties the artist has sustained.
The artist's actual damages would equal five percent of the
proven resale value.
VI
Proposal for Statutory Damages
The Act represents the introduction of the moral rights doc-
trine to American jurisprudence. Its provision allowing an in-
jured artist to seek recovery of actual damages, however,
presents problems in proving such damages. The artist may
find himself the subject of a system of judicial determination
which arbitrarily awards compensation according to the persua-
siveness of the parties. To relieve this situation, a system of
proving actual damages can be devised by drawing analogies to
other torts which protect similar interests.
Despite this possibility, the speculative nature of calculating
such damages still remains. As a rule, the amount recoverable
remains primarily within the discretion of a jury which may or
may not be sensitive to the issues involved in the fine arts.
Thus the artist is left at the mercy of changing sentiments and
baseless approximations of the harm he has suffered. The art-
ist is also exposed to the risk that he may recover only nominal
damages which are insufficient compensation for the reputa-
tional harm suffered.
The proposed analogous system of proving actual damages
also fails to properly address the personal nature of the rights
involved and merely skirts the issue of moral rights.
Through statutory amendment, the gap left by the provision
for actual damages can be filled. An additional provision for
188. Section 987(b)(2) provides an exclusive definition of fine art which includes
only original paintings, sculptures, drawings and works in glass. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Of these types of fine art covered by the Act, only
sculptures are capable of being produced in duplicates. Id. Through the use of master
molds, a limited series of the same sculpture may be produced. Of course, the value of
each sculpture in the series will be diluted as the number in the series is increased.
189. As in the case of an art expert testifying as to the artist's professional reputa-
tion, an art appraiser would be expected to take a neutral stance in his appraisal. See
sources cited supra note 96.
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statutory damages' 90 would offer a meaningful alternative for
the injured artist. Statutory damages would also be especially
applicable to an unestablished artist who lacks a professional
reputation upon which compensation for his or her injuries
may be based.
Statutory damages have proven to be an effective remedy in
cases arising under the copyright laws. A plaintiff artist bring-
ing an action under the Copyright Act'91 is assured a better-
than-nominal amount if he prevails in his action. In addition,
the Copyright Act allows for an increase in the amount of stat-
utory damages in the event of a willful infringement and a re-
duction in the event of an innocent infringement. 92 In this
way, the damages serve to deter willful acts of infringement
while tempering their punitive role where there is an absence
of malice. The assurances conveyed by this remedial system
provide a realistic incentive for artists to enforce their
copyrights.
Borrowing from the Copyright Act of 1976,193 an amendment
to the Act may read as follows:
Section 987(e): To effectuate the rights created by this sec-
tion, the artist may commence an action to recover or obtain
any of the following:
(6) Statutory damages. The artist may elect, at any time
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of
actual damages, an award of statutory damages for all
physical defacements, mutilations, alterations, or destruc-
tion of a work of fine art in a sum of not less than $1,000 or
more than $10,000 as the court considers just.
(i) In a case where the creator of the work of art
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds,
that a physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or
destruction of a work of fine art was committed will-
fully, the court in its discretion may increase the
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$50,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the
burden of proving, and the court finds, that such in-
fringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of the
190. Statutory damages are damages resulting from statutorily created causes of
action, as opposed to actions at common law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed.
1979).
191. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
192. Id. § 504(c)(2).
193. Id. § 504(c) (remedies for infringement: damages and profits).
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artist's rights under this section, the court in its dis-
cretion may reduce the award of statutory damages.
Conclusion
The moral rights of an artist are for the most part unpro-
tected in the United States. It has been the tradition of Ameri-
can jurisprudence to protect the economic rather than the
personal rights of artists. If an artist's work is mutilated or de-
stroyed, he has the choice of accepting the loss, disclaiming au-
thorship of the altered work, or attempting to enforce his rights
under "analogous" legal doctrines. These legal doctrines, how-
ever, are either too cumbersome, or too insufficient to offer a
meaningful remedy for the aggrieved artist.
In landmark legislation, California became the first jurisdic-
tion to provide protection for an artist's moral rights. The Art
Preservation Act 194 protects the artist's right of integrity by
making actionable any intentional alteration or destruction of
his work. It also protects the right of paternity by allowing the
artist to claim or disclaim authorship. The Act permits an in-
jured artist to recover, among other remedies, actual damages.
Artists, especially unestablished artists, may encounter nu-
merous obstacles in attempting to prove actual damages under
the Act. Borrowing proofs allowed in other torts which protect
similar interests 95 is helpful, but fails to address the personal
nature of the issues and still involves a substantial measure of
speculation.
By adding a provision for statutory damages to the Act, art-
ists in California would have a meaningful alternative remedy
for harms they have suffered as a result of unauthorized altera-
tions of their work. A scheme of remedies which includes stat-
utory damages as an alternative remedy will ensure the
efficacy of the Act and allow a more complete realization of its
objectives. In conjunction with the Act's existing remedies, an
artist's moral rights in California will more than adequately
protect the artist's interests in his reputation and the public's
interest in preserving its cultural heritage.
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1987).
195. For purposes of this Note, these analogous torts are libel, invasion of privacy,
and infliction of emotional distress.
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